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Abstract. We discuss the lessons learned from implementing a CATO
style system using factors with magnitude. In particular we identify that
giving factors magnitudes enables a diversity of reasoning styles and
arguments. We distinguish a variety of ways in which factors combine to
determine abstract factors. We discuss several different roles for values.
Finally we identify the additional value related information required to
produce a working program: thresholds and weights as well as a simple
preference ordering.
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1. Introduction
Reasoning with legal cases has always been a central concern of AI and Law. Much
of the investigation of this topic has been based on the pioneering work of Rissland
and Ashley’s HYPO system [23], [6]. Subsequent development of HYPO’s ideas
is described in [8]. While HYPO used dimensions, aspects of a case which were
described using a range with one end favouring the plaintiff and the other end
favouring the defendant, most subsequent work has used the simpler notion of
factors to represent cases. Factors, as introduced in CATO [5], are stereotypical
fact patterns which are legally significant and which can be seen in Boolean
terms, as either present or absent [8]. For a discussion of the differences between
dimensions and factors, see [24]. Using the simplification enabled by representing
cases as a set of Booleans, a good understanding of this kind of reasoning has been
developed, as formalised in [18] and [21]. It remains a simplification, however,
and many researchers have often felt that it would become necessary to return to
dimensions in order to give a full account of reasoning with legal cases (e.g. [11]).
Both HYPO and CATO supported argumentation in US Trade Secret law and
took as their starting point section 757 of the Restatement of Torts:
“Some factors to be considered in determining whether given information is
one’s trade secret are: the extent to which the information is known outside of
his business; the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved
in his business; the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the
information; the value of the information to him and to his competitors; the
amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the information; and
the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired
or duplicated by others”1.
In CATO, we find several factors such as InfoObtainableElsewhere, In-
foKnownToCompetitors, SecurityMeasures, CompetitiveAdvantage and InfoRe-
verseEngineerable, all of which clearly originate in this section of the Restatement,
but which are represented as Booleans, despite the emphasis on the extent to
which these notions are satisfied in the Restatement. From this it is clear that con-
cepts which are treated as Boolean factors in CATO, should not really be Boolean
but have magnitudes (extents, amounts, degrees of difficulty and the like), and it
should be for the court (rather than the analyst as in CATO) to decide whether
the extent is sufficient, given the particular facts of the case. The simplification
from dimensions to factors has proved useful, greatly facilitating understanding of
several aspects of legal CBR, but the time has now come to return to the original
notions of dimensions and factors with magnitude and much attention in recent
AI and Law research has focussed on how this can best be done.
The persistent need for dimensions was argued in [11] and related to argu-
mentation schemes for legal CBR in [20]. Formal representations for exploring a
logic of precedent for dimensions and factors with magnitude have recently been
proposed by Horty [17] and Rigoni [22]. In [7] a method for representing case
law using factors with magnitude based on the methodology of [2] was described
and an implementation of Aleven’s CATO analysis using this representation as
formalised in [1] was demonstrated at the COMMA 2018 conference [10]. In this
paper we draw out the lessons learned from that implementation which can be
used to guide future research on the topic.
Section 2 describes the representation used. Section 3 discusses the various
ways in which factors are combined. Section 4 relates the implementation to
the statement types of [3]. Section 5 discusses the additional types of reasoning
enabled by using magnitudes and gives a hypothetical example case and variations
to illustrate these different kinds of reasoning. Section 6 offers some concluding
remarks.
2. Representation
The knowledge in the implemented program is represented following the AN-
GELIC methodology [2], specifically using the 2-regular structure of [1], in which
statements (issues, intermediate concepts and factors) are represented as nodes
and non-leaf nodes have exactly two children (see Table 1). Essentially this is
used as the design documentation on which the implementation of [10] is based.
Each non-leaf node is associated with acceptance conditions, expressed in
terms of its two children. Like [9] the statements have degrees of acceptance, in
range [0,1]: 0 representing total rejection and 1 total acceptance. Some statements
are genuinely Boolean and they use only 0 and 1. The acceptance conditions are
then a set of conditions for attributing particular degrees of acceptance, together
1http://www.lrdc.pitt.edu/ashley/RESTATEM.HTM italics ours.
Table 1. 2-Regular ADF for CATO.
Parent Child 1 Child 2
TradeSecretMisappropriation SecretMisappropriated EmployeeSoleDeveloper
SecretMisappropriated InfoMiasappropriated
Info
Trade Secret
Info
Miasappropriated
BreachOfConfidence ImproperMeans
Info
Trade Secret
InfoValuable EffortstoMaintainSecrecy
InfoValuable InfoUseful KnownOrAvailable
EffortstoMaintainSecrecy AdequateEfforts SecurityFailures
InfoUseful CompetitiveAdvantage UniqueProduct
KnownOrAvailable Known Available
Known KnownOutside Limitations
InfoAvailableElsewhere InfoReverseEngineerable InfoObtainableElsewhere
KnownOutside InfoKnownToCompetitors DisclosureInPublicForum
Limitations UniqueProduct MaintainSecrecyOutsiders
MaintainSecrecyOutsiders SecretsDisclosedOutsiders OutsiderDisclosuresRestricted
AdequateEfforts SecurityMeasures MaintainSecrecyDefendant
SecurityFailures Reckless WaiverOfConfidentiality
MaintainSecrecyDefendant AgreedNotToDisclose DisclosureInNegotiations
Reckless NoSecurityMeasures SecretsDisclosedOutsiders
Disclosed DisclosureInPublicForum MaintainSecrecyOutsiders
BreachOfConfidence InfoUsed ConfidentialRelationship
ImproperMeans QuestionableMeans* LegitimatelyObtainable
ConfidentialRelationship NoticeofConfidentiality ConfidentialityAgreement
ConfidentialityAgreement AgreedNotToDisclose WaiverOfConfidentiality
InfoUsed GaveHelp InfoIndependentlyGenerated
NoticeofConfidentiality ValidAgreement AwareConfidential
QuestionableMeans IllegalMethods DEfOKMethods
LegitimatelyObtainable InfoKnownorAvailable InfoAvailableElsewhere
GaveHelp IdenticalProducts GaveAdvantage
GaveAdvantage BroughtTools CompetitiveAdvantage
IllegalMethods Criminal Dubious
DefOKMethods DisclosureInNegotiation DefendantDiscovered
Criminal BribeEmployee InvasiveTechniques
Dubious RestrictedMaterialsUsed Deception
DefendantDiscovered InfoIndependentlyGenerated InfoReverseEngineered
AwareConfidential RestrictedMaterialsUsed KnewInfoConfidential
ValidAgreement AgreementMade AgreementInForce
AgreementMade AgreedNotToDisclose OutsiderDisclosuresRestricted
AgreementInForce AgreementNotSpecific WaiverOfConfidentiality
DisclosureInNegotiations
BribeEmployee
EmployeeSoleDeveloper
AgreedNotToDisclose
AgreementNotSpecific
SecurityMeasures Magnitude
BroughtTools Magnitude
CompetitiveAdvantage
SecretsDisclosedOutsiders Magnitude
VerticalKnowledge
OutsiderDisclosuresRestricted
NoncompetitionAgreement
RestrictedMaterialsUsed
UniqueProduct
InfoReverseEngineerable
InfoIndependentlyGenerated Magnitude
IdenticalProducts Magnitude
NoSecurityMeasures Magnitude
InfoKnownToCompetitors
KnewInfoConfidential
InvasiveTechniques
WaiverOfConfidentiality
InfoObtainableElsewhere Magnitude
InfoReverseEngineered
Deception
DisclosureInPublicForum
with a default degree. Not all factors need to be ascribed magnitudes. Of the
26 factors in [5], 17 turned out to be adequately modelled as Boolean, but 9
were modelled with magnitudes. Even in HYPO, 10 of the 13 dimensions can
adequately be modelled as Booleans [8], and Rigoni [22] recognises that there are
these two types of factor and accordingly represents cases with a set of Booleans
factors, as well as a set of factors with magnitude. Our program was implemented
using SWI Prolog (Windows version).
It may be for some nodes (especially those with disjunctive children) that
the acceptance conditions do not give an answer. For example there may be no
evidence of competitive advantage offered, and hence there are no relevant facts
for either side. Equally, there may be no mention of any disclosures. In such
cases a default must be used. This is chosen to reflect the burden of proof. For
example, it is generally uncontested that there was some competitive advantage
from using the information, and this is usually simply accepted: thus it defaults
to the plaintiff. Here the onus is on the defendant to show that the information
provided no competitive advantage. In contrast, the existence of a confidential
relationship must be demonstrated by the plaintiff, and so the relevant factors
default to the defendant. In this way, the defaults can be used to assign the burden
of proof, as revealed in the precedent cases.
3. Combining Factors
Examination of the structure used to represent the domain knowledge reveals that
although each non-leaf node has two children, these children play a variety of roles
for the different nodes. Consider for example the top of the tree, which represents
the issues identified in the Restatement, which form the “logical model” used in
[14]. At this level, we are dealing mainly with issues, such as was the information
misappropriated? and was the information a Trade Secret?. These are Boolean (as
discussed in [3]), found either for the plaintiff or the defendant, and the children
are there either because the parent requires the satisfaction of multiple conditions
(e.g. SecretMisappropriated), or because there are several conditions which enable
the parent to be satisfied (e.g. InfoMiasappropriated). The very top level, how-
ever, represents a general rule with an exception: TradeSecretMisappropriation is
normally satisfied if SecretMisappropriated but has an exception: if the case has
the factor EmployeeSoleDeveloper, then TradeSecretMisappropriation is not sat-
isfied. This represents a preference: the presence of factor EmployeeSoleDeveloper
casts doubt on the ownership of the information and is taken to outweigh the
considerations leading to TradeSecretMisappropriation: if the courts had decided
otherwise in the relevant precedents, the exception would not appear.
As well as such preference based exceptions, we find exceptions which are
motivated not by preferences and precedents, but by the very meanings of the
terms. Consider MaintainSecrecyOutsiders. This is normally not satisfied, as one
would expect, if we have SecretsDisclosedOutsiders. But there is an exception if
we also have OutsiderDisclosuresRestricted. This is not a matter of preference: by
making any disclosures to outsiders subject to restrictions, the plaintiff must be
regarded as having made efforts to maintain secrecy with respect to outsiders, as
a consequence of the meanings of the words involved.
Another kind of node is where a balance is struck between two competing
factors [19]. This is illustrated by the node ImproperMeans, which requires that
a balance be struck between the information having been obtained by Question-
ableMeans and being LegitimatelyObtainable. It is, of course, possible that infor-
mation which was obtainable legitimately was in fact obtained using question-
able means. Thus the extent to which questionable means were used has to be
weighed against the ease with which the information could have been obtained
legitimately. This involves weighting the values concerned: do we want to encour-
age enterprise or strict adherence to ethical principles? In practice there has been
a preference given to finding for the plaintiff if questionable means have been
used, but this cannot be seen as absolute. If the information had been readily
available on, say, Wikipedia, then some mild deception in obtaining the secret
might be overlooked. In order to represent this relationship we ascribe weights to
the values of the children involved. The values are taken from [15], which have
also been used in later work such as [1]. An alternative set of values and ways of
handling balances and trade offs using Boolean factors, can be found in [16].
Finally we have nodes at which conversion from children with magnitude
to Boolean parents takes place. Here we are considering whether the extent of
satisfaction represented by the children is sufficient to allow the parent to be
considered satisfied. To achieve this, each value is associated with a threshold.
Note that the thresholds can be set independently, since they are only required
to be used in this way, not for comparison with one another. These thresholds
receive a good deal of emphasis in the formal approaches of both [17] and [22].
The former divides the range into two factors, one a pro-plaintiff and one pro-
defendant, with the point of division determined by precedents. Rigoni divides
the range into a number of factors with a precedent determined “switching point”
where the factors cease to be pro-plaintiff and become pro-defendant. These points
correspond to our thresholds.
Acceptance conditions can thus take a variety of forms, depending on whether
the children have magnitude, and how they are combined. Our program [10] uses
the following acceptance condition types:
• Conjunctions: Used to provide multiple conditions all of which must be
satisfied for the acceptability of a node. One or both conditions may have
magnitude (represent degrees of acceptability). As in Fuzzy Logic [25], the
minimum of the individual conjuncts is ascribed to the conjunction as a
whole, enabling uniform treatment of Booleans and factors with magnitude.
• Disjunctions: Used to provide multiple conditions at least one of which must
be satisfied for the acceptability of a node. One or both conditions may
have magnitude (represent degrees of acceptability). As in Fuzzy Logic, the
maximum of the individual disjuncts is ascribed to the disjunction.
• Preference Based Exceptions: Used to represent exceptions based on prece-
dents expressing a preference between values. Preferences are based on val-
ues, taken from [15]. Should the value preference be changed, the exception
disappears, since it is no longer sufficient to defeat the general case.
• Definition Based Exceptions: Used to represent exceptions based on prece-
dents relying on word meanings. The exception depends on the meanings
of the terms involved: no preference is required.
• Comparison with a threshold: This converts factors with magnitudes to
Booleans. The result of conjoining (or disjoining) the children is compared
to a threshold, and 1 or 0 is returned accordingly.
• Balancing two factors using weights. This is used to strike a balance be-
tween two features. It uses weights based on the values associated with the
children and the extents to which the children are satisfied. This is similar
to the method used in [15] to handle comparison between factors which
may promote values to different extents.
In the program there were 37 nodes, of which 19 were disjunctions and 4
conjunctions. We had 4 preference based exceptions, 2 definitional exceptions and
7 nodes employing thresholds. 1 node expressed a trade off.
3.1. Values and Their Roles
What is particularly interesting about the above characterisation of the ways in
which factors can combine, is the clarification it gives to the roles of values. Orig-
inally, as in [12], factors all promoted some value, and conflicts were resolved ac-
cording to a value structure applicable to the whole domain. This uniformity was,
however, shown to be inappropriate in [26], where it was shown that values could
motivate not only whole rules (and the preferences between them), but also the
inclusion of particular terms in the antecedents of rules, so as to enable the value
to be given proper consideration. We now see that the picture is a little more
complicated. The role of values is certainly to ensure that the various concerns
they represent are properly considered. But their use to establish preferences is
limited to the relatively few rules in which a balance must be struck to express
a trade off, or a preference requires an exception to a general rule. In the first
case we use weights established by precedents in the manner of [15], whereas in
the second the preference is in the existence of the exception. A third role is to
establish thresholds for determining whether a factor is satisfied to a sufficient ex-
tent. These thresholds do not use a preference ordering, since they are considered
independently: they are, however, justified in terms of precedents2 and may be set
higher or lower to reflect the switching points manifest in the precedents. Thus,
not only do values play several roles, but preferences between them are limited to
a few nodes, and need not be consistent across the whole structure. This makes
the reasoning more akin to Branting’s reasoning with portions of precedent [13]
than the holistic view taken by CATO and [12].
4. Statement Types
In [3] a number of different statement types were identified. Obviously the verdict
must be Boolean: the court must decide for one party or the other. As we saw
from the Restatement of Torts, the base level factors can have magnitude. The
2Some factors, like SecretsDisclosedOutsiders have a natural mapping to numbers, while
others do not. For the latter, however an ordering on fact situations can be established (as with
SecurityMeasures in [6]) and this order reflected in the magnitudes assigned.
implementation starts with the base level factors as input, so at some point the
factors with magnitude have to be transformed to a Boolean. This must be done
at, or before, the issues are reached.
The extents ascribed to the base level factors are decided by the court, and
courts may disagree. Thus we find parts of the opinions discussing whether the
lower court had correctly determined, for example, the extent to which the infor-
mation was reverse engineerable, or was available elsewhere3. As we propagate the
magnitudes assigned to base level factors up the tree, at some point the parent
factor will need to become a Boolean, since issues are held to favour either the
plaintiff, or the defendant. This means that if we have a branch ending in one or
more base level factors with magnitude, at some point a threshold will need to
be applied. This transition will not always occur at the border between abstract
factors and issues, since some of the abstract factors, like some of the base level
factors, may themselves be Boolean. However, the thresholds must be used to
transform the factors with magnitude to Booleans when, or before, the issue level
is reached. The use of thresholds is illustrated in the example given in section 5.
Note that there are two distinct points for the court to address: the extent to
which the base level factor is satisfied, and the threshold that must be reached if
the abstract factor is to be satisfied. If we do not allow factors to have magnitudes,
these two points are conflated and both are decided by the analyst representing the
cases: whereas they should be transparent and subject to explicit argumentation.
They should kept distinct and both aspects decided by the court. In particular
we often find minority opinions expressing disagreement as to the extent to which
a factor is satisfied and, separately, as to whether the degree to which a factor is
satisfied is sufficient to resolve the issue for a given party.
Transforming factors with magnitudes to Booleans is the primary role of
thresholds, and it is essential. Examination of our program [10] reveals the im-
portance of thresholds: they determine whether a factor is satisfied to a sufficient
extent to enable an exception to be implied: without magnitudes any extent what-
soever could be considered sufficient. In the current implementation the thresh-
old is dependent only on the value to which it relates, and the same threshold
is used for all such tests relating to a given value. It remains possible, however,
that different thresholds should be used to determine which party is favoured by
an issue, and whether an exception should be applied. We leave this for future
investigation, which will involve a careful analysis of actual opinions.
5. Reasoning with Factors with Magnitude
With the Boolean factors of CATO we can challenge a decision only by adding
or removing a factor, or by changing a preference. With magnitudes we have the
further options of:
3Of course, courts do not assign numbers to these extents, but they do order them, and this
ordering can be mapped to numbers for computation. For example, Mr Justice Stevens says in
California v Carney “It is perfectly obvious that the citizen has a much greater expectation of
privacy concerning the interior of a mobile home than of a piece of luggage such as a footlocker”.
It is, however, clear that the majority disagreed with Stevens when the mobile home was in use
as a vehicle. This can be reflected in the magnitudes assigned in the different opinions.
• Increasing the degree of presence of a factor
• Decreasing the degree of presence of a factor
• Raising the threshold for factors relating to a particular value
• Lowering the threshold for factors relating to a particular value
• Adjusting the relative weights of factors
This provides a number of different ways in which decisions can be contested,
whereas CATO allowed only for different preferences between the factors involved,
and approaches such as [12] reduced all disputes to disagreements about value
preferences.
We illustrate these options with the following hypothetical Trade Secrets case.
Plaintiff in US produced a widget. This was a distinctive product, but something
similar was manufactured in China (uniqueProduct, but less than 1). Drawings of
the widget were kept in an unlocked drawer in the plaintiff’s office (securityMea-
sures but less than 1). The defendant was in the plaintiff’s office and was left alone.
He searched the desk and looked at the drawings and photographed them on his
phone (invasiveTechniques). Defendant claimed that the drawings confirmed his
view that the product was reverse engineerable (infoReverseEngineerable but less
than 1). Defendant also claimed that the information could have been obtained
from the Chinese company (infoObtainableElsewhere but less than 1). Suppose
we start with some initial parameters and facts (only non-zero base level factors
are given). Relevant values are legitimate means (lm), questionable means (qm)
and material worth (mw). Note that two values used in [15] (reasonable efforts
and confidential agreement) do not need weights or thresholds since they appear
only in exceptions:
weight(qm,1). % Questionable methods and
weight(lm,1). % Legitimate methods have equal weights
% Thresholds are all neutral between parties
threshold(lm,0.5). threshold(re,0.5). threshold(mw,0.5).
invasiveTechniques(1).
securityMeasures(0.6). % Security measures somewhat lax,
% but intended to keep info secret
uniqueProduct(0.8). % Similar product, but not in US
infoReverseEngineerable(0.3). % Product considered rather
% hard to reverse engineer
infoObtainableElsewhere(0.4). % Obtainable from Chinese firm
These facts will find for the plaintiff. We can now suggest arguments for
modifying them:
• Perhaps the reverse engineerability should be considered more straight-
forward (after all the information had been independently developed in
China). Increasing the magnitude to 0.6 (or greater: precision is not crucial)
will enable a finding for the defendant
• Perhaps the threshold for reverse engineerability is too low: if the informa-
tion is really readily ascertainable, why steal it? Raising the threshold to
0.8 will find again for the plaintiff.
• The security measures were rather poor: the drawer was not even locked.
Decreasing the magnitude to 0.4 (or lower) will find for the defendant.
• But perhaps inventors should be given more protection: the defendant
should not be rifling through the plaintiff’s drawers. Lowering the threshold
to 0.3 will restore the case for the plaintiff.
• Perhaps the balance between legitimate and questionable means is wrong:
perhaps “all’s fair in love, war and business”. Raising the weight given to
legitimate methods to 3 will find for the defendant.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have consolidated our current understanding of reasoning with
legal cases using factors with magnitudes, by drawing out lessons we have learned
by implementing the approach in the standard domain for factor based systems,
US Trade Secrets as modelled in HYPO and CATO. In particular we have learned:
• That magnitudes are important to reflect the reasoning found in opinions.
In particular they enable a variety of arguments which go beyond simply
preferring one set of factors or values to another. These additional types of
arguments have been identified in section 5. This requires that each value
is given a threshold to represent the switching points of [22].
• We have confirmed the importance of the “switching points” as identified
by the formal approaches of [17] and [22]. However, we have also identified
another kind of argument not catered for in the papers: namely trade offs as
discussed in [7] and [16]. This requires that values also be assigned weights
to be used to strike an appropriate balance in the trade offs. Thus we
require two sets of value related parameters: thresholds and weights.
• The key reason for values is to enable due consideration of various aspects
the law is meant to address. We have identified three separate roles for
values: establishing thresholds, motivating weights and justifying preference
based exceptions. However, we have shown that values affect relatively few
nodes (about one third in our particular application).
• We have shown that children in the factor hierarchy (ADF) do not con-
tribute homogeneously to the acceptability of their parents: we have iden-
tified six different ways in which children are combined.
In sum, we have identified a diversity of types of reasoning, and arguments,
required when considering legal cases, moving beyond the rather uniform reason-
ing found in previous factor and value based approaches. It shows the different
ways in which factors combine, the roles played by values, and various argumen-
tative options not available in a Boolean setting. It shows what is (e.g. thresh-
olds), and what is not (e.g. trade offs), captured in the formalisations of [17] and
[22]. We intend to use magnitudes in our on-going work with legal firms [4] and
to use these lessons to inform and improve the planned future application of our
approach to further domains.
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